XVII—38. 27
LE. 19. 11

Eſſaies.

Religious Meditations.

Places of perſwasion and diſſwaſion.

Seene and allowed.

Printed at London for Iohn Iaggard, dwelling in Fleete ſtreete at the hand and Starre neere Temple barre.
1606.



Academiæ Cantabrigiensis Liber.

found a great part [illegible]

Eſsaies.

1. Of ſtudie.
2. Of diſcourſe.
3. Of ceremonies, and reſpects.
4. Of followers and friends.
5. Of Sutors.
6. Of expence.
7. Of Regiment of health.
8. Of Honor and reputation.
9. Of Faction.
10. Of Negociating.

Essaies.

1. Of study.
2. Of discourse.
3. Of ceremonies, and respects.
4. Of followers and friends.
5. Of Suitors.
6. Of expence.
7. Of Regiment of health.
8. Of Honor and reputation.
9. Of Fashion.
10. Of Negociating.

To Maiſter Anthony Bacon his deare Brother.

LOuing & beloued brother I do now like ſome that haue an Orcharde il neighbored, that gather their fruit before it is ripe, to preuent ſtealing. Theſe fragments of my conceits were going to print: To labour the ſtay of them had bene troubleſome, and ſubiect to interpretation: to let them paſſe had bin to aduentur the wrong they might receiue by vntrue Coppies, or by ſome garniſhment which it might pleaſe any that ſhold ſet them forth to beſtow vpon them. Therefore I helde it beſt diſcretion to publiſh them my ſelfe as they paſſed long agoe from my pen without any fur-

ther disgrace, then the weakenes of the author. And as I did euer hold there might be as great a vaxity in retyring and withdrawing mens conceits (except they be of some nature) from the world, as in obtruding them: So in these particulars I haue played my selfe the inquisitor, and find nothing to my vnderstanding in them contrary, or infectious to the state of Religion, or manners, but rather (as I suppose) medicinable. Onely I disliked now to put them out, because they will be like the late newe halfepence, which though the siluer were good, yet the pieces were small. But since they would not stay with their master, but wold needs trauel abroad, I haue preferred them to you, that are next my self, dedicating them, such as they are, to our loue, in the depth

depth whereof (I assure you) I sometimes wish your infirmities translated vpon my selfe, that her maiesty might haue the seruice of so actiue and able a mind, and I might bee with excuse confined to these contemplations and studies for which I am fittest, so commende I you to the preseruation of the diuine Maiestie. From my Chamber at Grayes Inne, this 30. of Ianuary. 1597.

Your entire louing brother
Francis Bacon.



ESSAIES.

Of Studies.

STudies ſerue for paſtimes, for ornaments, and for abilities. Their chiefe vſe for paſtime is in priuateneſſe and re-

ting: for ornament is in diſcourſe, nd for ability is in iudgement. For xpert men can execute, but learned nen are fitteſt to iudge or cenſure.

To ſpend too much time in them s ſloth, to vſe them too much for or-ament is affectation: to make iudge-nent wholly by their rules, is the hu-nor of a Scholler. They perfect *Na-ure*, and are perfected by experience. Crafty men contemne them, ſimple nen admire them, and wiſe men vſe hem: for they teach not their owne ſe, but that is a wiſedome with-ut them: and aboue them wonne y obſeruation. Read not to con-

tradict,

tradict, nor to beleeue, but to weig
and consider. Some bookes are to b
tasted, others to be swallowed, an
some fewe to be chewed and disge
sted. That is, some bookes are to b
read only in parts: others to be rea
but cursorily, and some fewe to be
read wholy and with dilligence an
atention. Reading maketh a ful man
conference a ready man, and writin
an exact man. And therfore if a ma
write little, he had need haue a grea
memory: if he confer little, haue
present wit, and if he read little, he
hadde neede haue much cunning, t
seeme to know that he doth not. Hi
stories make men wise, Poets witty
the Mathematiks subtill, natural phi
losophy deep, Morall graue, Logic
and Rhetoricke, able to contend.

Of Discourse.

Some in their discourse desire ra
ther commendation of wit in be
ing

g able to hold all arguments, then iudgement in diſcerning what is ue, as if it were a praiſe to know hat might be ſaid, & not what ſhold thought. Some haue certain com- on places and Theames wherein ey are good, and want variety, hich kind of pouerty is for the moſt rt tedious, and now and then ridi- lous. The honorableſt part of talke o giue the occaſion, and againe to oderate & paſſe to ſomewhat elſe. is good to vary and mixe ſpeech of e preſent occaſion with argument, les with reaſons, asking of queſtiõs, ith telling of opinions, & ieſt with rneſt. But ſome things are priuiled- ed from ieſt, namely religion, mat- rs of ſtate, great perſons, any mans reſent buſineſſe of importance, and y caſe that deſerueth pitty. He that ueſtioneth much ſhall learne much, d content much, ſpecially if he ap- y his queſtions to the skill of the perſon

perſon of whom he asketh, for he ſh
giue them occaſion to pleaſe them
ſelues in ſpeaking, and himſelfe ſha
continually gather knowledge. If yo
diſſemble ſometimes your knowled
of that you are thought to know, yo
ſhall bee thought another time t
know that you know not. Speech
a mans ſelfe is not good often, an
there is but one caſe, wherein a ma
may commend himſelfe with goo
grace, & that is in commending ve
tue in another, eſpecially if it be ſuc
a vertue, as whereunto himſelfe pre
tendeth. diſcretion of ſpeech is mor
then eloquence, and to ſpeake agree
ably to him, with whom we deale
more then to ſpeake in good word
or in good order. A good continue
ſpeech without a good ſpeech of in
terlocution ſheweth ſlowneſſe: and
good reply or ſecond ſpeech with
out a good ſet ſpeech ſheweth ſha
lownes and weakeneſſe, as we ſee i
beaſte

beasts, that those that are weakest in the course are yet nimblest in the turne. To vse too many circumstances ere one come to the matter is wearisome, to vse none at al is blunt.

Of Ceremonies and Respects.

HE that is onely reall had neede haue exceeding great parts of vertue, as the stone had need be rich that is set without foyle. But commonly it is in praise as it is in gaine. For as the prouerbe is true, *That light gaines make heauy purses*: because they come thick, whereas great come but now & then, so it is as true that smal matters win great commendation: because they are continually in vse and in note, whereas the occasion of anye great vertue commeth but on holy daies. To attaine good formes, it sufficeth not to dispise them, for so shal a man obserue thē in others, and

let

let him truſt himſelfe with the reſt, for if he care to expreſſe them hee ſhall leeſe their grace, which is to be natural and vnaffected. Some mens behauior is like a verſe wherein euery ſillable is meaſured. How can a man cõprehend great matters that breaketh his mind too much to ſmall obſeruations? Not to vſe Ceremonies at all, is to teach others not to vſe them againe, and ſo diminiſh his reſpect, eſpecially they be not to be omitted to ſtrangers and ſtrange natures. Amongſt a mans peeres a man ſhall be ſure of familiarity, and therfore it is a good title to keepe ſtate: among a mans inferiors one ſhalbe ſure of reuerence, and therfore it is good a little to be familiar. He that is too much in any thing, ſo that he giue another occaſion of ſatiety, maketh himſelfe cheape. To apply ones ſelfe to others is good, ſo it be with demonſtration that a man doth it vpon regard, and not

not vpon facility. It is a good precept generally in seconding another: yet to adde somewhat of ones own, as if you will graunt his opinion, let it be with some destinction. If you wil follow his motion: let it be with condition: if you allow his counsell, let it be with alleadging further reason.

Of followers and friends.

COstly followers are not to be liked, least while a man maketh his trayne longer, he make his wings shorter: I reckon to be costly not the alone which charge the purse, but which are wearisome and importune in sutes. Ordinary following ought to challenge no higher conditions then countenance, recommendation and protection from wrong.

Factious followers are worse to be liked, which follow not vpon affecti-

on to him with whom they range themselues, but vpon discontentment conceiued against some other, whervpon commonly insueth that ill intelligence that wee many times see between great personages. The following by certain States answerable to that which a great person himselfe professeth, as of souldiers to him that hath been employed in the wars, and the like hath euer beene a thing ciuil, and wel taken euen in Monarchies, so it bee without too much pompe or popularity. But the most honorable kind of following is to be followed, as one that apprehendeth to aduance vertue and desert in all sorts of persons, & yet wher there is no eminent oddes in sufficiency, it is better to take with the more passable, then with the more able. In gouernment it is good to vse men of one rancke equally, for to countenance some extraordinarily, is to make them insolent, and the rest di

content, because they may claime a due. But in fauours to vse men with much difference & election is good, for it maketh the persons preferred more thankful, and the rest more officious, because all is of fauour. It is good not to make too much of any man at first because one cannot hold out that proportion. To be gouerned by one is not good, & to be distracted with many is worse: but to take aduise of friends is euer honorable: *For lookers on many times see more then gamesters, & the vale best discouereth the hill.* There is little friendship in the world, & least of al between equals, which was wont to bee magnified. That that is, is between superior and inferiour, whole fortunes may comprehend the one the other.

Of Sutors.

MAny ill matters are vndertaken, and manye good matters with ill minde. Some em-

brace Sutes which neuer meane to deale effectually in them. But if they ſee there may be life in the matter by ſome other meane, they will be content to win a thanke, or take a ſecond reward. Some take hold of ſutes only for an occaſion to croſſe ſome other, or to make an information, whereof they could not otherwiſe haue an apt pretext, without care what becõe of the ſute, when that turn is ſerued. Nay ſome vndertake ſutes with a ful purpoſe to let them fal, to the end to gratifie the aduerſe party or competitor. Surely there is in ſort a right in euery ſute, either a right of equity, if it be a ſute of controuerſie: or a right of deſert, if it be a ſute of petition. If affection lead a man to fauour the wrong ſide in iuſtice, let him rather vſe his countenance to compound the matter then to carry it. If affection lead a man to fauor the leſſe worthy in deſert, let him do it without deprauing

or

or diſabling the better deſeruer. In ſutes a man doth not well vnderſtād, it is good to refer them to ſome friēd of truſt & iudgment, that may report whether he may deale in them with honor. Sutors are ſo diſtaſted with delaies & abuſes, that plaine dealing in denying to deale in ſutes at firſt, and reporting the ſucceſſe barely, and in challenging no more thanks then one hath deſerued, is growen not only honorable, but alſo gratious. In ſutes of fauor the firſt cōming ought to take little place, ſo far forth conſideration may be had of his truſt, that if intelligence of the mater could not otherwiſe haue been had but by him, aduantage be not taken of the note. To be ignorant of the value of a ſute is ſimplicity, as wel as to be ignorant of the right thereof is want of conſcience. Secrecy in ſutes is a great mean of obtaining, for voycing them to bee in forwardneſſe may diſcourage

ſome kind of tutors, but doeth quicken and awake others. But tyming of the ſutes is the principall, tyming I ſay not onely in reſpect of the perſon that ſhould graunt it, but in reſpect of thoſe which are like to croſſe it. Nothing is thought ſo eaſie a requeſt to a great perſon as his letter, and yet if it bee not in a good cauſe, it is ſo much out of his reputation.

Of Expence.

Riches are for ſpending, and ſpending for honour and good actions. Therefore extraordinary expence muſt bee limited by the worth of the occaſion, for voluntary vndoing may be as well for a mans countrey as for the kingdome of heauen. But ordinary expence ought to be limited by a mans eſtate, and gouerned with ſuch regard, as it be within his compaſſe

and

and not ſubiect to deceite and abuſe of ſeruants, and ordered to the beſt ſhew, that the billes may be leſſe then the eſtimation abroad. It is no baſeneſſe for the greateſt to diſcend and looke into their owne eſtate. Some forbeare it not vpō negligence alone, but doubting to bring themſelues into melancholy in reſpect they ſhall find it broken. *But woundes cannot bee cured without ſearching.*

He that cannot looke into his own eſtate, had need both chuſe wel thoſe whom he employeth, yea and change them often. For newe are more timerous and leſſe ſubtle. In clearing of a mans eſtate he may as well hurt himſelfe in being too ſuddaine, as in letting it run on too long, for haſty ſelling is commonly as diſaduantageable as intereſt. He that hath a ſtate to repaire may not diſpiſe ſmal things; and cōmonly it is leſſe diſhonorable to a bridge petty charges, then to

stoupe to perrye gettinges. A man ought warily to begin charges, which once begunne must continue. But in matters that returne not, he may bee more magnificent.

Of Regiment of health.

THere is a wisedome in this beyond the rules of Physicke. A mans own obseruation what hee findes good of, and what he findes hurt of, is the best Physicke to preserue health. But it is a safer conclusion to say, This agreeth not well with me, therefore I will not continue it, then this, I finde no offence, of this therefore I may vse it. For strength of nature in youth passeth ouer many excesses, which are owing a man till his age. Discerne of the comming on of years, and thinke not

ot to doe the ſame things ſtill. Be-
are of any ſuddaine change in any
reat point of diet, and if neceſſity
force it, fit the reſt to it. To be free
inded and chearefully diſpoſed at
oures of meate, and of ſleepe, and
f exerciſe, is the beſt precept of long
ſting. If you fly phyſick in health al-
ogether, it will bee too ſtrange to
our body when you ſhall need it. If
ou make it too familiar it wil work
o extraordinary effect when ſicknes
ommeth. Deſpiſe no new accident
the body but aske opinion of it. In
kneſſe reſpect health principally,
d in health action. For thoſe that
ut their bodyes to endure in health,
ay in moſt ſickneſſes which are not
ry ſharpe, be cured onely with diet
d tendring. Phyſitians are ſome of
em ſo pleaſing and comfortable to
e humours of the patient, as they
reſſe not the true cure of the diſ-
ſe: and ſome other are ſo regular in

procee-

proceeding according to art, for th
diſeaſe, as they reſpect not ſufficient
ly the condition of the patient. Tak
one of a middle temper, or if it ma
not be found in one man, compoun
two of both ſortes, and forget not t
call as well the beſt acquainted wit
your body, as the beſt reputed of fo
his faculty.

Of Honour and reputation.

THe winning of honor is but th
reuealing of a mans vertue an
worth without diſaduantage, fo
ſome in their actions doe affect Ho
nour and reputation, which ſorte
men are commonly much talked o
but inwardly litle admired: and ſom
darken their vertue in the ſhew of
ſo as they be vnder-valued in opin
If a man performe that which ha
not beene attempted before, or a
tempte

mpted and giuen ouer, or hath been
chiued, but not with ſo good cir-
mſtance, hee ſhall purchaſe more
nor, then by effecting a matter of
eater difficulty or vertue, wherein
is but a follower. If a man ſo tem-
his actions as in ſome one of thē
do content euery faction or com-
nation of people, the Muſicke will
the fuller. A man is an ill husband
his honor that entreth into any ac-
on the failing wherin may diſgrace
m more, then the carrying of it
rough can honor him. Diſcreet fol-
wers help much to reputation. En-
whi. his the cāker of honor is beſt
tinguiſhed by declaring a mans
fe in his endes, rather to ſeeke me-
e then fame, and by attributing a
ans ſucceſſes rather to deuine pro-
dence and felicity, then to his ver-
e or policy.

The true Marſhaling of the
grees of Soueraigne Honour are
theſe

these. In the first place are *Conditor* founders of states. In the seco place are *Legislatores*, Law-giue which are also called second fou ders, or *Perpetui principes*, beca they gouern by their ordinances ter they are gone. In the third pl are *Liberatores*, such as compoun the long miseries of ciuil wars, or liuer their countries from seruitu of strangers or tyrants. In the fou place are *propagatores*, or *propugnato imperij*, such as in honorable wars l large their territories, or make N ble defence against inuaders. And the last place are *Patres patriæ*, whi raigne iustly, and make the tim good wherein they liue. Degrees honor in subiectes are first *Partici curarum*, those vpon whom princ do discharge the greatest weight their affaires, their *Right hands* (as v call them.) The next are *Duces b li*, great leaders, such as are Princ Lieut

utenantes, and do them notable
ices in the warres. The third are
tiosi, fauorites, such as exceed not
scantling to be solace to the So-
aigne, and harmles to the people.
d the fourth *Negotijs pares*, such as
e great place vnder Princes, and
cute their places with sufficiency

Of Faction.

MAny haue a newe wise-
dome indeed, a fond o-
pinion: That for a prince
to gouerne his estate, or
for a great person to go-
ne his proceedings according to
e respects of Factions, is the prin-
all part of policy. Whereas con-
riwise, the chiefest wisedom is ey-
r in ordering those things which
e generall, and wherein men of se-
ral factions do neuertheles agree,
in dealing with correspondence

to

to particular persons one by one. But I say not that the consideration of Factions is to be neglected.

Meane men must adheare, but great men that haue strength in themselues were better to maintain themselues indifferent and neutrall, yea euen in beginners to adheare so moderately, as hee be a man of the one faction, which is passablest with the other, commonly giueth best way.

The lower and weaker Faction is the firmer in coniunction.

When one of the Factions is extinguished, the remaining subdiuideth, which is good for a second. It is commonly seene, that men once placed, take in with the contrary faction to that by which they enter.

The traitor in factions lightly goeth away with it, for when matters haue stucke long in ballancing, the winning of some one man casteth them, and he getteth al the thanks.

Of

IT is generally better to deale by ſpeech then by letter, and by the meditation of a third then by a mans ſelfe. Letters are good when a man would draw an aunſwere by Letter backe againe, or when it may ſerue for a mans iuſtification afterwards to produce his owne Letter. To deale in perſon is good when a mans face breedes regard, as commonly with inferiors. In choyce of inſtrumentes it is better to chuſe men of a playner ſorte that are like to doe that that is committed to them, and to report backe againe faithfully the ſucceſſe, then thoſe that are cũning to contriue out of other mens buſines ſomewhat to grace themſelues, and will help the matter in reporte for ſatisfactions ſake.

It is better to ſounde a perſon with

22 with whom one deales a far off, then to fall vpon the point at first, except you meane to surprise him by some short question. It is better dealing with men in appetite, then with those which are where they would be. If a man deale with another vpon conditions, the start or first performance is al, which a man cannot reasonably demaund, except either the nature of the thing be such which must go before, or else a man can perswade the other party that he shal stil need him in some other thing, or els that he be counted the honester man. All practise is to discouer or to worke: men discouer themselues in trust, in passion, at vnwares, & of necessity, when they would haue somwhat done, and cannot finde an apt pretext. If you would work any man, you must eyther know his nature and fashions, & so lead him; or his endes, and so win him; or his weakneſſe or disaduanta-

ges,

ges, and ſo awe him, or thoſe that haue intereſt in him and ſo gouerne him. In dealing with cunning perſons wee muſt euer conſider their ends to interpret their ſpeeches, and it is good to ſay little to them, and that which they leaſt looke for.

Meditationes ſacræ.

OF the workes of God and man.
Of the miracles of our Sauiour.
Of the innocencie of the Doue and the wiſedome of the Serpent.
Of the exaltation of Charity.
Of the moderation of Cares.
Of earthly hope.
Of Hypocrites.
Of Impoſtors.
Of the ſeuerall kindes of Impoſture.
Of Atheiſme.
Of Hereſies.
Of the Church and the ſcriptures.

God beheld al things which his hands had made, and loe they were all passing good. But when man turned him about, & tooke a view of the workes which his handes had made, he found al to be vanity and vexation of spirit: wherefore if thou shalt worke in the works of God, thy sweat shalbe as an oyntment of odours, and thy rest as the Sabbaoth of God. Thou shalt trauaile in the sweat of a good cõscience, and shall keepe holyday in the quietnesse and liberty of the sweetest contemplations. But if thou shalt aspire after the glorious actes of men, thy working shall be accompanied with compunction and strife, and thy remembrance followed with distast and vpbraidings, and lastly doeth it come to passe towards thee (O man)

that since thou which art Gods work doest him no reason in yeelding him well pleasing seruice, euen thine own workes also should reward thee with the like fruit of bitternesse.

Of the miracles of our Sauiour.

He hath done all things well.

A True confession and applause: God when he created al things, saw that euery thing in particular, and all things in general were exceeding good, God the word in the miracles which he wrought (now euery miracle is a new creation and not according to the first creation) would doe nothing which breathed not towardes men fauour and bountye. *Moyses* wrought Miracles and scourged the Egyptians with manye plagues. Elyas wrought Miracles and shut vppe heauen that no

rain ſhould fall vpon the earth, and againe brought downe from heauen the fire of god vpon the captaines & their bands. Elizeus wroght alſo and called Bears out of the deſart to deuoure young children. Peter ſtroke Ananias the ſacrilegious hipocrite with preſent death, & Paule Elimas the ſorcerer with blindenes, but no ſuch thing did Ieſus, the ſpirit of God diſcended downe vppon him in the forme of a Doue, of whom he ſaide, *You know not of what ſpirit you are.* The ſpirit of Ieſus is the ſpirit of a Doue, thoſe ſeruants of god were as the Oxen of God treading out the corn and trampling the ſtrawe downe vnder their feete, but Ieſus is the Lambe of God without wrath or iudgements. All his miracles were conſumate about mans body, as his doctrine reſpected the ſoule of man. The body of man needeth theſe things, ſuſtenance, defence frō outward wrongs

and

and medicine, it was hee that drew a multitude of fiſhes into the nets that he might giue vnto men more liberal prouiſion. He turned water, a leſſe worthy nouriſhment of mans body, into wine a more worthy, that glads the heart of man. He ſentenced the Fig-tree to wither for not doing that dutye whereunto it was ordained, which is to beare fruit for mens food. He multiplyed the ſcarſitye of a few loaues & fiſhes to a ſufficiency to victuaile an hoſt of people. He rebuked the winds that threatned deſtruction to the ſeafaring mē: he reſtored motion to the lame, light to the blinde, ſpeech to the dumbe, health to the ſick, cleannes to the leaprous, a right minde to thoſe that were poſſeſſed, & life to the dead. No miracle of his is to be found to haue been of iudgment or reuenge, but al of goodneſſe and mercy, and reſpecting mans body: for as touching richcs he did not

vouchsafe to do any miracle, saue one onely that tribute might be giuen to *Cæsar*.

Of the innocency of the Doue, and wisedome of the Serpent.

The foole receiueth not the word of wisedome, except thou discouer to him what he hath in his heart.

SO a man of a peruerse and corrupt iudgement all instruction or perswasion is fruitlesse and contemptible, which beginnes not with discouery, and laying open of the distemper and ill cõplexion of the minde, which is to be recured as a plaister is vnseasonably applyed before the wound bee searched: for men of corrupt vnderstanding that haue lost all soũd discerning of good and euill, come possest with this preiudicate opinion, that they thinke

think all honesty and goodnes proceedeth out of a simplicity of manners, & a kind of want of experience and vnacquaintance with the affaires of the world. Therefore except they may perceiue that those things which are in their hearts, that is to say, their own corrupt principles, & the depest reaches of their cunning & rottennes to be throughly sounded & known to him ꝑ goeth about to perswade with thē they make but a play of the words of wisedome. Therfore it behooueth him which aspireth to a goodnes (not retired or particular to himselfe, but a fructifieng and begetting goodnes, which should drawe on others) to know those points, which he called in the reuelation the deeps of Sathan. That he may speak with authority & true insinuatiō. Hence is the precept: *Try al things and hold that which is good*, which indureth a discerning election out of an examination whence no-

thing at all is excluded, out of the ſame fountain ariſeth that direction: *Be you wiſe as ſerpents, & innocẽt as doues.* There are neither teeth nor ſtings, nor venime, nor wreaths and foulds of ſerpents which ought not to be al known, & as far as examination doth lead, tryed: neither let any man here feare infection or pollution, for the ſun entreth into ſinkes and is not defiled. Neither let any man think that herein he tempteth God, for his diligence and generality of examination is commanded, and *God is ſufficient to preſerue you immaculate and pure.*

Of the exaltation of Charitie.

If I haue reioyced at the ouerthrow of him that hated me, or tooke pleaſure when aduerſity did befall him.

The deteſtation or renouncing of Iob.

For a man to loue againe where he is loued, it is the charity of Publi-

cans

cans contracted by mutuall profite, and good offices, but to loue a mans enimies is one of the cũningeſt points of the law of Chriſt, and an imitation of the diuine nature. But yet again of this charity there be diuers degrees, wherof the firſt is to pardon our enemies when they repent: of which charity there is a ſhadow & image, euen in noble beaſtes, for of Lyons it is a receiued opinion, that their fury and fierceneſſe ceaſeth towards any thing that yeeldeth and proſtrateth it ſelfe. The ſecond degree is to pardon our enemies, though they perſiſt & without ſatiſfactions & ſubmiſſions. The third degree is not onely to pardon and forgiue & forbeare our enemies, but to deſerue well of them, and to do them good. But al theſe three degrees either haue or may haue in thẽ a certain brauery and greatnes of the mind, rather then pure Charity: for when a mã perceiueth vertue to proceed

ceed and flow from himſelf, it is poſ-
ſible that he is puffed vppe and takes
contentment rather in the fruit of his
own vertue, then in the good of his
neighbors: but if any euill ouertake
the enemy from any other coaſt, the
from thy ſelf, and thou in the inwar-
deſt motiõs of thy hart beeſt grieued
and compaſſionate & doſt no waies
inſult as if thy daies of right and re-
uenge were at the laſt come. This I
interpret to be the height and exal-
tation of Charity.

Of the moderation of cares.

Sufficient for the day is the euill thereof.

THere ought to be a mea-
ſure in worldly cares o-
therwiſe they are both
vnprofitable, as thoſe
which opreſſe the mind
and aſtoniſh the iudgment, and pro-
phane

phane as thoſe which ſauour of a minde which promiſeth to it ſelfe a certaine perpetuity in the things of this world: for we ought to be daies-men, and not to morrows-men, conſidring the ſhortnes of our time, and as he ſaith: *Laying holde on the preſent day:* for future thinges ſhall in their turnes become preſent: therefore the care of the preſent ſufficeth: and yet moderate cares (whether they concerne our particular or the common wealth, or our friendes) are not blamed. But herein is a twofold exces, the one when the chain or thred of our cares extended and ſpun out to an ouer great length, and vnto times too far off, as if we could bind the diuine prouidence by our prouiſions, which euen with the heathen was alwaies found to be a thing inſolent and vnlucky, for thoſe which did atribute much to fortune, & wer ready at hand to apprehend with ala-

crity

erity the preſent occaſions, haue for the moſt part in their actions beene happy. But they who in a compaſſe wiſedome haue entred into a confidence that they had belaied al euents, haue for the moſt part encountred misfortune. The ſecond exceſſe is, when wee dwell longer in our cares then is requiſite for due deliberating or ſtinne reſoluing: for who is there amongſt vs that careth no more then ſufficeth either to reſolue of a courſe, or to conclude vpon an impoſſibility, and doth not ſtill chewe ouer the ſame things, and tread a maze in the ſame thoughts, and vaniſheth in them without iſſue or concluſion, which kinde of cares are moſt contrary to all diuine and humaine reſpects.

Of

Better is the ſight of the eye, then the apprehenſion of the minde.

PVre ſence receiuing euery thing according to the naturall impreſſion maks a better ſtate and gouernment of the minde then theſe ſame imaginations and apprehenſions of the mind: for the minde of man hath this nature and property, euen in the graueſt and moſt ſetled wits, that frō the ſence of euery particular, it doth as it were bound and ſpring forward, and take holde of other matters foretelling to it ſelfe that all ſhall proue like vnto that which beateth vpon the preſent ſence: if the ſence bee of good, it eaſilie runnes into an vn-limited hope, and into a like feare, when the ſence is of euill, according as is ſaid.

The oracles of hopes doth oft abuſe.

And

And that contrary,

A froward ſouthſayer is fear in doubts.

But yet of fear there may be made ſome vſe, for it prepareth patience, and awaketh induſtry.

No ſhape of il, comes new or ſtrange to me.
All ſorts ſet down, yea and prepared be.

But hope ſeemeth a thing altogether vnprofitable, for to what end ſerueth this conceit of good. Conſider and note a little if the good fall out leſſe then thou hopeſt, good though it be, yet leſſe becauſe it is, it ſeemeth rather loſſe then benefit through thy exceſſe of hope: if the good proue equal and proportionable in euent to thy hope, yet the flower therof by thy hope is gathered, ſo as when it comes, the grace of it is gone, and it ſeems vſed and therfore ſooner draweth on ſaciety: admit thy ſucceſſe prooue better then thy hope, it is true againe ſeemes to bee made: but had it not bene better to

haue

haue gained the principal by hoping for nothing then the increaſe by hoping for leſſe. And this is the operation of hope in good fortunes, but in miſfortunes it weakneth all force & vigor of the mind: for neither is ther alwaies matter of hope, and if there be, yet if it faile but in part, it dooth wholy ouerthrow the conſtancy and reſolution of the mind, and beſides though it doth carry vs through, yet it is a greater dignity of minde to bear euils by fortitude & iudgment, then by a kind of abſenting and alienatiō of the mind from things preſent to things future, for that it is to hope. And therefore it was much lightneſſe in the Poets to faine hope to be as a counterpoyſon of humane deſeaſes, as to mittigate and aſſwage the fury and anger of them, whereas indeed it doth kindle and inrage the, & cauſeth both doubling of them & relapſes. Notwithſtanding we ſee ꝑ the grea-

greatest number of men giue themselues ouer to their imaginations of hope & apprehensions of the minde, in such sort that vngratefull towards things past, and in a manner vnmindfull of things present, as if they were euer children and beginners, they are still in longing for things to come. *I saw al men walking vnder the sun resort & gather to the second person, which was afterwards to succeede, this is an euill disease and a great idleneſſe of the mind.*

But perhaps you will aske the question, whether it bee not better when things stand in doubtful terms, to presume the best, and rather hope wel then distrust, specially seeing that hope doth cause a greater tranquillity of mind.

Surely I do iudge a state of minde, which in all doubtful expectations is setled & floteth not, and doth this out of a good gouernment and composition of the affections, to be one of the

the principall ſupports of mans life: But that aſſurance and repoſe of the mind, which onely rides at ancor vpon hope. I do reiect as wauering and weak, not that it is not conuenient to foreſee & preſuppoſe out of a ſound and ſober coniecture as wel the good as the euil, that therby we may fit our actions to the probabilities and likelihoods of their euent, ſo that this be a worke of the vnderſtanding & iudgment with a due bent and inclination of the affectiō: but which of you hath ſo kept his hopes within limites, as when it is ſo that you haue out of a watchfull and ſtrong diſcourſe of the mind ſet down the better ſucceſſe to be in apparancy the more likely, you haue not dwelt vpon the very muſe andforethought of the good to come and giuing ſcope and fauour to your mind to fall into ſuch cogitations as into a pleaſant dreame: and this it is which makes the minde light, frothy,

vnequall and wandering: wherefore all our hope is to be bestowed vpon the heauenly life to come. But heere on earth the purer our sence is from the infection and tincture of imagination, the better and wiser soule.

The summe of life to little doth amount,
And therefore doth forbidde a longer count.

of Hipocrites.

I demaund mercy and not sacrifice.

ALl the boasting of the hipocrite is of the wroks of the first Table of the law, which is of adoration and dutye towardes God: whereof the reason is double both because such works haue a greater pompe and demonstration of holines, and also because they do lesse crosse their affections and desires, there-

therefore the way to conuict hipocrits, is to send them from the works of sacrifice to the workes of mercy, whence commeth that saying. *This is pure and imaculate religion with God the father, to visite Orphanes & widdowes in their tribulations.* And that saying: *He that loueth not his brother whom he hath seene, how can he loue God whom he hath not seene.*

Now there is another kind of deeper and more extrauagant hipocrisie, for some deceiuing themselues, and thinking thēselues worthy of a more neere accesse and conuersation with god do neglect the duties of charity towardes their neighbor, as inferior matters, which did not indeed cause originally the beginning of a monasticall life (for the beginnings were good) but brought in that excesse and abuse which are followed after: For it is truely saide, *That the office of praying is a great office in the*

Church. And it is for the good of the Church, that there bee consortes of men freed frō the cares of this world who may with dayly & deuout supplication: and obseruances solicite the diuine maiesty, for the causes of the Church. But vnto this ordinance that other hipocrisie is a nigh neighbour, neither is the generall institution to bee blamed, but those spirites which exalt thēselues too high tobe refrained: for euen *Enoch* which was said to walke with god, did propheſie, as is deliuered vnto vs by Iude, & did indow the church with the fruit of his propheſie which he left: and Iohn Baptist, vnto whom they did refer as to the author of a monastical life, trauaild & exercised much in the ministry both of propheſie & baptizing, for as to these others who are so officious towardes God, to them belongeth that question: *If thou doe iustly what is that to God, or what profite*

doth he take by thy handes? Wherefore the workes of mercy are they which are the workes of distinction, whereby to finde out Hipocrites. But with heretikes it is contrary, for as hipocrites with their dissembling holynesse towards God doe palliate and couer their iniuries towards men: so Heretikes by their morality and honest carriage towards men insinuate and make away for their blasphemies against God.

Of Impostors.

Whether we be transported in mind it is to Godward.
Or whether we be sober it is to you wards.

THis is the true image and true temper of a man, and of him that is Gods faithfull workeman, his carriage and conuersation towards God is full of

passion, of zeale and of tramisses, thence procced grones vnspeakable, and exultings, likewise in comforte, rauishment of spirit and agonies. But contrariwise his cariage and conuersation towards men is ful of mildnes, sobriety, and applyable demeinor. Hence is that saying, *I am become all things to all men*, and such like. Contrary it is with Hipocrites and Impostors, for they in the Church and before the people set themselues on fire, and are carried as it were out of themselus, and becomming as men inspired w holy furies, they set heauen and earth together: but if a man did see their solitary and seperate meditations, and conuersation whereunto God is onely priuy, he might towards God finde them not onely cold and without vertue, but also full of ill nature, and leauen: *Sober enough to God, and transported onely towards men.*

Of the ſeuerall kinds of impoſture.

Auoide prophane ſtrangenes of Wordes and oppoſitions of knowledge, falſely ſo called.

Auoid fond and idle fables:

Let no man deceiue you by high ſpeech:

Here are three formes, of ſpeaking, which are as it were the ſtile and phraſe of impoſture: the firſt kind is of them, who as ſoon as they haue gotten any ſubiect or matter, do ſtraight caſt it into an art, inuenting new termes of art, reducing all into diuiſions and diſtinctions, thence drawing aſſertions or poſitions, and ſo framing oppoſitions by queſtions and anſweares, hence yſſueth the copwebs and clatterings of the Schoolemen.

The ſeconde kinde is of them who

who out of the vanity of their wit (as Church poets) do make and deuiſe all variety of tales, ſtories, and examples, whereby they may leade mens minds to a beliefe, fró whence did growe the Legendes and infinite fabulous inuentions and dreames of the ancient heretikes.

The third kind is of them, who fill mens eares with miſteries, high parables, Allegories, and illuſions: which miſticall and profound forme many of the heretikes alſo made choice of. By the firſt kind of theſe, the capacity and wit of man is fettered and entangled: by the ſecond it is trayned on and mueigled: by the third it is aſtoniſhed and enchanted, but by euery of them the while it is ſeduced and abuſed.

Of

The foole hath ſaid in his heart there is no God.

FIrſt it is to be noted that the Scripture ſaith, the foole hath ſaide in his hart, and not thought in his hart, that is to ſay, he doth not ſo fully thinke it in iudgement, as he hath a good will to be of that beliefe, for ſeeing it makes not for him that there ſhould be a God, he doeth ſeeke by all meanes accordingly, to perſwade and reſolue himſelfe, and ſtudies to affirme, proue & verifie it to himſelfe as ſome theame or poſition, all which labor, notwithſtanding that ſparkle of our creation light, whereby men acknowledge a Deity, burneth ſtill within, & in vaine doth he ſtriue vtterly to alienate it or put it out, ſo that it is out of the cor-

ruption

ruption of his heart and wil, and not out of the naturall apprehenſion of his braine & conceit, that he doth ſet down his opiniõ, as the comical Poet ſaith: *Then came my mind to be of mine opinion*, as if himſelfe and his mind had been two diuers things: therefore the Atheiſt hath rather ſaid and held it in his heart, then thought or belieued in his hart that there is no god. Secondly it is to be obſerued, that he hath ſaid in his hart, and not ſpoken it with his mouth. But again you ſhall note, that this ſmothering of this perſwaſion within ỹ hart cõmeth to paſſe for fear of gouernment & of ſpeech amongſt men: for as he ſaith, *To deny God in a publike argumẽt were much, but in a familiar conference were currant enough.* For if this bridle were remoued, there is no hereſie which wold contend more to ſpread and multiply, & diſſeminate it ſelfe abroad then atheiſme, neither ſhall you ſee thoſe men which are

drench

drencht in this frenſie of mind to breath almoſt any thing els, or to inculcate euen without occaſion, any thing more then ſpeech tending to atheiſme, as may appear in Lucreſias the Epicure, who makes of his inuectiues againſt religiō, as it were a burthen or verſe of return to al his other diſcourſes: the reaſō ſeemes to be, for that the atheiſt not relying ſufficiently vpon himſelf, floting in mind & vnſatiſfied & induring within many paintings, and as it were faīs of his opinion, deſires by other mens opinions agreeing with his to be recouered and brought againe: for it is a true ſaying.

Who ſo laboureth earneſtlye to proue his opinion to another, himſelfe diſtruſts it.

Thirdlye, it is a foole that hath ſaide in his heart, which is moſt true, not onely in reſpect that hee hath no taſte in thoſe thinges which are ſupernaturall and diuine;

uine : but in reſpect of humane and ciuill wiſedome : for firſt of all, if you mark the wits & diſpoſitions which are enclined to Atheiſme, you ſhall finde them light, ſcoffing, impudent, and vaine : briefely, of ſuch conſtitution, as is moſt contrary to wiſedome and morall grauity. Secondly, amongſt ſtates men and politiks, thoſe which haue bin of greateſt depths, and compaſſe, and of largeſt & moſt vniuerſal vnderſtāding haue not only in cunning made their profit in ſeeming religious to the people, but in truth haue bin touched with an inwarde ſence of the knowledge of Dyetie, as they which you ſhall euermore note to haue attributed much to fortune and prouidence.

Contrariwiſe, thoſe who aſcribe all things to their own cunnings and practiſes, and to the immediate and aparant cauſes : and as the Prophet ſaith, *Haue ſacrificed to their owne net*

haue

aue bin alwaies but petty counter-
ite ſtates men, and not capable of
he greateſt actions. Laſtly, this I
are affirm in knowledge of nature,
hat a little natural Philoſophy, and
he firſt entrance into it doth diſpoſe
he opinion to Atheiſm: But on the
ther ſide much natural philoſophy,
nd wading deepe into it, will bring
bout mens minds to religiō: where-
re Atheiſme euery way ſeemes to
e ioyned and combined with folly
nd ignorance, ſee that nothing can
e more iuſtly allotted to be the ſay-
g of fooles then this, *There is no god.*

Of Hereſies.

You erre not knowing the ſcriptures nor the power of God.

HIs *canon* is the mother of al Canons againſt hereſie: The cauſes of errour are two: the ignorance

rance of the wil of God, & the igno-
rãce or not ſufficient conſideratiõ of
his power, & wil of God is more re-
uealed by the ſcriptures, and there-
fore the precept is, *ſearch the ſcriptures*
the wil of God is more reuealed by
the creatures, and therefore the pre-
cept is: *Behold and conſider the creatures*
So is the fulnes of the power of God
to be affirmed, as we make no impu-
tation to his wil, ſo is the goodnes of
the wil of God to be affirmed, as we
make no derogation from his powe
Therefore true religion ſeated in
the meane betwixte ſuperſtitio
with ſuperſtitious Hereſies on th
one ſide, & Atheiſm, with prophan
hereſies on the other: Superſtitio
reiecting the light of the ſcripture
and giuing it ſelfe ouer to vngroun
ded traditions and writings doubtf
and not canonical, or to new reuela
tions, or to vntrue interpretations o
the ſcriptures themſelues doth forg
and dream many things of the wil

God, whichare ſtrange & far' diſtant from the true ſence of the ſcriptures? But Atheiſm and Theomachy rebelleth and mutineth againſt the power of God, giuing no faith to his word, which reuealeth his will, vpon a diſcredit and vnbeliefe of his power, to whom all thinges are poſſible. Now thoſe herifies which ſpring out of this fountaine ſeeme more haynous then the other: for euen in ciuill gouernment it is held an offence in a higher degree to deny the power and authority of a prince, then to touch his honor and fame. Of theſe hereſies which derogate from the power of god beſide plain atheiſm, there are 3 degrees, and they haue al one & the ſame miſtery: for al antichriſtianity worketh in a miſtery, that is, vnder the ſhadow of good, and it is this to free and deliuer the will of God from all imputation and aſperſion of ill. The firſte degree is of

thoſe

thoſe who make and ſuppoſe two principles contrary and fighting one againſt the other, the one of good, the other of euill.

The ſeconde degree is of them to whome the Maieſty of God ſeemes too much wronged in ſetting vp and erecting againſt him another aduerſe and oppoſite principle, namely ſuch a principle as ſhoulde be actiue and affirmatiue, that is to ſay, cauſe or fountaine of any eſſence or being: therfore reiecting all ſuch preſumption they doe neuertheleſſe bring in againſt God: a principle negatiue, and priuatiue, that is a cauſe of not being and ſubſiſting, for they will haue it to be an inbred proper work, and nature of the matter and creature it ſelfe, of it ſelfe to turne againe and reſolue into confuſion and nothing, not knowing that it is an effect of one and the ſame omnipotencie,

to

to make nothing of ſomewhat, as to make ſomwhat of nothing. The third degree is of thoſe, who abridge and reſtraine the former opinion only to thoſe humaine actions which partake of ſin: which actions, they wil haue to depend ſubſtantiuely and originally, and without any ſequele or ſubordination of cauſes vpon the will, and make and ſet downe and appoint larger limites of the knowledge of God then of his power, or rather of that part of Gods power (for knowledge it ſelfe is a power whereby he knoweth) then of that by which he moueth and worketh, making him foreknow ſome things idlie and as a looker on, which he doeth not predeſtinate nor ordaine: Not vnlike to that deuiſe which *Epicurus* brought into *Democritus* opinion, to take away deſtiny and make way to Fortune, to wit, the ſtart and ſlip of *Attemus*, which alwaies of the wiſer ſort was reiected as a moſt

fryuolous ſhift. But whatſoeuer depends not of god, as author and principle by inferior linkes and degrees, that muſt nedes bee in place of God, and a new principle, and a certaine vſurping god: wherefore worthely is that opinion refuſed as an indignity and derogation to the Maieſtye and power of God, and yet it is moſt truely affirmed, that God is not the author of euill, not becauſe he is not authour, but becauſe not as of euill.

Of the Church and the Scriptures.

Thou ſhalt protect them in thy tabernacle, from the contradiction of tongues.

THe contradiction of tongues doeth euerye where meete with vs out of the tabernacle of god, therefore whither ſoeuer thou ſhalt turne thy ſelfe, thou ſhalt finde

find no end of controuerſies, except thou withdraw thy ſelfe into that tabernacle, thou wilt ſay, t'is true and that it is to be vnderſtood of the vnity of the church: but heare and note, there was in the tabernacle the Arke, and in the Arke the teſtimony or tables of the law: what doeſt thou tell me of the huske of the tabernacle without the kernell of the teſtimony. The tabernacle was ordained for the keeping and deliuering ouer from hand to hand of the teſtimony. In like manner the cuſtody and paſſing ouer of the ſcriptures is committed vnto the Church. But the life of the tabernacle is the teſtimony.

OF The Colours of good and euill, a fragment.

E 3

1606.

Cui cetera partes vel sectæ secundas vnanimiter deferunt, cum singula principatum sibi vindicent, melior reliquis videtur. Nam primas quaeque ex zelo videtur sumere, secundas autem ex vero tribuere.

2 Cuius excellentia vel exuperantia melior, id toto genere melius.

3 Quod ad veritatem refertur maius est quàm quod ad opinionem. Modus autem & probatio eius quod ad opinionē pertinet hæc est. Quod quis si clam putaret fore facturus non esset.

4 Quod rē integrā seruat bonū, quod sine receptu est malū. Nam se recipere non posse impotētiæ genus est, potentia autē bonū

5 Quod ex pluribus constat, & diuisibilius est maius quàm quod expauciorib⁹ & magis vnū: nam omnia per partes considerata maiora videntur: quare & pluralitas partium magnitudinem præ se fert, fortius autem operatur pluralitas partium si ordo absit, nam inducit similitudinem infiniti, & impedit comprehensionem.

6 Cuius priuatio bona, malum, cuius prima

priuatio mala, bonum.

7 *Quod bono vicinum bonum, quod a bono remotum, malum.*

8 *Quod quis culpa sua contraxit, maius malum, quod ab externis imponitur, minus malum.*

9 *Quod opera, & virtute nostra partum est, maius bonum, quod ab alieno beneficio vel ab indulgentia fortuna delatum est, minus bonum.*

10 *Gradus priuationis maior videtur quàm gradus diminutionis, & rursus gradus inceptionis maior videtur, quàm gradus incrementi.*

IN deliberatiues the pointe is what is good, and what is euil, and of good what is greater, & of euil what is leſſe. So that the perſwaders labor is to make things appeare good or euill, and that in higher or lower degree, which as it may be performed by true and ſolide reaſons, ſo it may be repreſented alſo by coulours, popularities and circumſtance, which are of ſuch force, as they ſway the ordinary iudgment either of a weak man, or of a wiſe man, not fully & conſiderately

ſiderately attending and pondering the matter. Beſides their power to alter the nature of the ſubiect in appearance, and ſo to leade to errour, they are of no leſſe vſe to quicken and ſtrengthen the opinions and perſwaſions which are true: for reaſons plainely deliuered, and alwaies after one manner eſpecially with fine and faſtidious minds, enter but heauily and dully: whereas if they bee varied and haue more life and vigor put into them by theſe formes and inſinuations, they cauſe a ſtronger apprehenſion, and many times ſuddainelye winne the minde to a reſolution. Laſtly, to make a true and ſafe iudgement, nothing can be of greater vſe and defence to the minde,

then

then the discouering and repre-
hension of these colours, shew-
ing in what cases they hold, and
in what they deceiue: which as
it cannot bee done, but out of
a very vniuersall knowledge of
the nature of thinges, so being
performed, it so cleereth mans
iudgement and election,
as it is the lesse apt to
slide into any
errour.

A Table of the Colours, or apparances of good and euill, and their degrees, as places of perſwaſion and diſwaſion, and their ſeuerall fallaxes, and the clenches of them.

Cui ceteræ partes vel ſectæ ſecundas vnanimiter deferunt, cum ſingulæ principatum ſibi vindicent, melior reliquis videtur, nam primas quæque ex zelo videtur ſumere, ſecundas autem ex vero & merito tribuere.

O Cicero went about to proue the ſecte of Academiques which ſuſpended all aſſeueration, for to be the beſt: for ſaith he, aske a Stoicke which philoſopy is true, he wil prefer his own. Then aske him which approcheth next the truth, we will confeſſe the Academiques. So deale with the Epicure that will scant indure the Stoicke to bee in ſight

ſight of him, ſo ſoon as he hath placed himſelfe, he will place the Academiques next him.

So if a Prince took diuers competitors to a place, and examined them ſeuerally, whom next themſelues they would ratheſt commend, it were like the ableſt man ſhould haue the moſt ſecond votes.

The fallax of this color hapneth oft in reſpect of enuye, for men are accuſtomed after themſelues and their own faction to incline to thē which are ſofteſt, and are leaſt in their way in deſpight and derogation of them that hold them hardeſt to it. So that this color of meliority and prehemi-nence is of a ſigne of eneruation and weakeneſſe.

2. *Cuius excellentia vel exuperantia melior, id toto genere melius.*

APpertaining to this are the formes: *Let vs not wander in ge-neralities*

ralities: let vs compare particular with particular, &c. This appearance though it ſeeme of ſtrength, and rather Logicall then Rhetoricall, yet is very oft a fallax,

Sometime becauſe ſome thinges are in kind very caſuall, which if they eſcape, proue excellent, ſo that the kind is inferior, becauſe it is ſo ſubiect to perill, but that which is excellent being proued is ſuperior, as the bloſſome of March & the bloſſome of May, wherof the French verſe goeth

Burgeon de Mars enfant de Paris.
Si vn eſchape, iben vaut dix.

So that the bloſſome of May is generally better then the bloſſome of March, and yet the beſt bloſſome of March is better then the beſt bloſſome of May. Sometimes becauſe the nature of ſome kindes is to be more equall and more indifferent, and not to haue very diſtant degrees, as hath been noted in the warmer clymates,

the

the people are generally more wise, but in the Northern clymate the wits of chiefe are greater. So in many armies, if the matter should be tryed by duel between two champions, the victory shold go on the one side, and yet if it bee tryed by the grosse, it would go on the other side: for excellencies go as it were by chaunce, but kindes goe by a more certaine nature, as by discipline in warre.

Lastly many kindes haue much refuse, which counteruaile that which they haue excellent, and therefore generally mettall is more precious then Stone, and yet a Diamond is more precious then gold.

3 *Quod ad veritatem refertur maius est quàm quod ad opinionem. Modus autem & probatio eius quod ad opinionem pertinet, hoc est quod quis si clam putaret fore, facturus non esset.*

So

SO the Epicures say of the Stoicks felicity placed in vertue. That it is like the felicity of a player, who if he were left of his auditory and their applause, he would straight be out of heart and countenance, and therfore they call vertue *Bonum theatrale*. But of riches the Poet saith.

Populus me sibilat,
At mihi plaudo.

And of pleasure:

Grata sub imo
Gaudia corde premens, vultu
simulate pudorem.

The Fallax of this colour is somwhat subtile, though the answer to the example be ready, for vertue is not chosen *propter auram popularem*. But contrariwise, *Maxime omnium teipsum revere*, So as a vertuous man will be vertuous in *solitudine*, and not only in *theatro*, though percase it will bee more stronge by glorye and fame, as an heate which is doubled

bled by reflection: But that denyeth the ſppoſition, it doth not reprehend the fallax, wherof the reprehenſion is alow, that vertue (ſuch as is ioyned with labor and conflict) wold not be choſen but for fame and opinion, yet it followeth not that the chiefe motiue of the election ſhould not be real & for it ſelfe, for fame may be only *cauſa impulſiua*, and not *cauſa conſtituens*, or *efficiens*. As if there were two horſes, and the one wold doo better without the ſpur then the other: but again the other with the ſpur would far exceede the doing of the former giuing him the ſpur alſo, yet the latter will bee iudged to be the better horſe, & the forme as to ſay, *Tuſh, the life of this horſe is but in the ſpur*, wil not ſerue as to a wiſe iudgment: for ſince the ordinarye inſtrument of horſemanſhip is the ſpur, and that it is no manner of impediment, nor burden the horſe is not to be recounted the leſſ

leſſe of, which wil not do well without the ſpur, but rather the other is to be reckoned a delicacy then a vertue, ſo glory and honor are the ſpurs to vertue, and although vertue wold languiſh without thē, yet ſince they be alwaies at hand to attend vertue, vertue is not to be ſaid the leſſe choſen for it ſelfe, becauſe it nedeth the ſpur of faine & reputation: and therfore that poſition, *Nota eius rei quod propter opinionem & non propter veritatē eligitur, hæc eſt, quod quis ſiclam putaret fore facturus non eſſet* is reprehended.

4 *Quod rem integram ſeruat bonum, quod ſine receptu eſt malum. Nam ſe recipere non poſſe impotentia genus eſt, potentia autem bonum.*

HEreof Aeſope framed the fable of the two Frogs that conſuled together in time of droweth (when many plaſhes that they had repayred to)

were dry what was to be done, and the one propoũded to go downe into a deepe Well, becauſe it was like the water would not faile there, but the other anſwered, yea but if it do faile, how ſhall we get vp againe, And the reaſon is, that humane actions are ſo vncertaine and ſubiect to perils, as that ſeemeth the beſt courſe which hath moſt paſſages out of it. Appertaining to this perſwaſion the formes are, *you ſhal ingage your ſelf*, on the other ſide, *Tantum, quantum voles, ſumes ex fortuna*, you ſhall keepe the matter in your own hand. The reprehenſion of it is, *That proceeding and reſoluing in all actions is neceſſary:* For as he ſaith well, *not to reſolue, is to reſolue*, and many times it breeds as many neceſſities, & ingageth as far in ſome other ſort as to reſolue. So it is but the couetous mans diſeaſe tranſlated into power, for the couetous man will enioy nothing becauſe hee will haue his full

ſtore

store & possibility to enioy the more, so by this reason a man should execute nothing because he shold be still indifferent and at liberty to execute any thing. Besides necessity and this same *iacta est alea* hath many times an aduantage, because it awaketh the powers of the mind, & strengtheneth indeauour, *Ceteris paret necessitate certe superiores estis.*

5 *Quod ex pluribus constat et diuisibilius est maius quàm quod ex paucioribus & magis vnum: nam omnia per partes cõsiderata maiora videntur, quare et pluralitas partium magnitudinẽ præ sẽ fert, fortius antẽ operatur pluralitas partium si ordo absit, nam inducit similitudinem infiniti, & impedit comprehensionem.*

THis colour seemeth palpable, for it is not pluralitye of partes without maiority of parts that maketh ỹ total greater, yet ne-

nertheleſſe it often carries the mind away, yea, it deceiueth the ſence, as it ſeemeth to the eie a ſhorter diſtance of way if it be all dead and cõtinued, then if it haue trees or buildings, or any other marks wherby the eie may diuide it. So when a great mõied man hath deuided his cheſtes and coines, and bags. he ſeemeth to himſelfe richer then he was, and therfore a way to amplifie any thing, is to breake it, & to make anotomy of it in ſeueral parts, & to examine it according to ſeueral circumſtances. And this maketh the greater ſhew if it be done without order, for confuſion maketh thinges muſter more, and beſides what is ſet downe by order and diuiſion doth demonſtrate that nothing is left out or omitted, but all is there, whereas if it be without order both the minde comprehendeth leſſe that which is ſet down, and beſides it leaueth a ſuſpition, as if more

might

might be ſaid then is expreſſed.

This color deceiueth, if the mind of him that is to be perſwaded do of it ſelfe ouer conceiue or preiudge of the greatnes of any thing, for thē the breaking of it wil make it ſeem leſſe, becauſe it maketh it appeare more according to the truth, & therefore if a man be in ſickneſſe or paine, the time wil ſeem lōger without a clock or hower-glaſſe then with it, for the minde doth value euery moment, and then the hower doth rather ſum vp the moments then deuid the day. So in a dead plaine, the way ſeemeth the longer, becauſe the eie hath preconceiued it ſhorter then the truth: and the fruſtrating of that maketh it ſeeme longer thē the truth. Therfore if any man haue an ouer great opinion of any thing, thē if another think by breaking it into ſeuerall conſiderations, he ſhal make it ſeeme greater to him, he wil be deceiued, and ther-

fore in ſuch caſes it is not ſafe to diuide, but to extoll the entire ſtill in generall. Another caſe wherin this Colour deceiueth, is, when the matter broken or diuided is not cõprehended by the ſence or minde at once in reſpect of the diſtracting or ſcattering of it, and being intire and not diuided, is comprehended, as a hundred pounds in heapes of fiue pounds will ſhew more thẽ in one groſſe heap, ſo as the heapes be al vpon one table to be ſeen at once, otherwiſe not, as flowers growing ſcattered in diuers beds wil ſhew more then if they did grow in one bed, ſo as all thoſe beds be within a plot that they bee obiect to view at once, otherwiſe not: and therfore men whoſe liuing lyeth together in one ſhire, are cõmonly counted greater landed then thoſe whoſe liuings are diſperſed, though it bee more, becauſe of the notice & comprehenſion. A third caſe wherein this

colour

colour deceiueth, and it is not so properly a case or reprehension, as it is a counter-colour being in effect as large as the colour it selfe, and that is, *Omnis compositio indigentiæ cuiusdam videtur esse particeps*, because if one thing wold serue the turne it were euer best, but the defect and imperfectiõs of things hath brought in that help to piece thẽ vp as it is said, *Martha, Martha attendis ad plurima, vnum sufficit.* So likewise hereupon Aesope framed the fable of the Fox and the Cat, wheras the Fox bragged what a number of shiftes and deuises hee had to gette from the hounds, and the Cat said she had but one, which was to clime a tree, which in proofe was better worth thẽ al the rest, wherof the prouerbe grew, *Multa nouit Vulpes, sed Felis vnum magnum.* And in the morall of this fable it coms likewise to passe: That a good sure friend is a better help at a pinch, then al the stratagems

and pollicies of a mans own wit. So it falleth out to be a common error in negociating, whereas men haue many reasons to induce or perswade, they striue commonly to vtter & vse them all at once, which weakeneth them. For it argueth as was said, a needines in euery of the reasons by it selfe, as if one did not trust to any of them, but fled frō one to another, helping himselfe onely with that. *Et quæ nō prosunt singula multa iuuant.* Indeed in a set speech in an assembly it is expected a man should vse all his reasons in the case he handleth, but in priuate perswasions it is alwaies a great errour. A fourth case wherein this color may be reprehended is in respect of that same *vis vnita fortior*, according to the tale of the French king, that when the Emperors Ambassador had recited his masters stile at large, which consisteth of many countries and dominions: the French

King

King willed his Chancellor or other minister to repeate and say ouer France as many times as the other had recited the seuerall dominions, intending it was equiualent with thē al, and beside more compacted & vnited. There is also appertaining to this color an other point, why breaking of a thing doth help it, not by way of adding a shew of magnitude vnto it, but a note of excellency and rarity: wherof the formes are, *Where shal you find such a concurrence? Great but not compleate*, for it seemes a lesse worke of nature or fortune to make any thing in his kinde greater then ordinary, then to make a strange cōposition. Yet if it be narowly considered, this color wil be reprehended or incoūtred by imputing to al excellencies in compositions a kinde of pouerty or at least a casualty or ieopardy, for from that which is excellent in greatnesse somewhat may be taken

taken or there may be decay, and yet sufficiency left, but from that which hath his price in compoſition if you take away any thing, or any part do faile, all is diſgraced.

6 *Cuius priuatio bona, malum, cuius priuatio mala, bonum.*

THe formes to make it conceiued that that was euil which is changed for the better are: *He that is in b thinks there is no other heauen. Satis quercus, Acorns were good til bread was found &c.* And of the other ſide the formes to make it conceiued that that was good which was chaunged for the worſe are, *Bona magis carendo quàm fruendo ſentimus: bona a tergo formoſiſſima Good things neuer appear in their full beauty, till they turne their backe, and be gone away, &c.* The reprehenſion of this colour is, that the good or euill which is remooued may be eſteemed good or euill comparatiuely, and not poſitiue

fitiuely or ſimply. So that if the priuation be good, it followes not the former condition was euill, but leſſe good, for the flower or bloſſome, is a poſitiue good, althogh the remoue of it to giue place to the fruite bee a comparatiue good. So in the tale of Eſope when the old fainting man in the heate of the day caſt downe his burthen and called for death, and when death came to know his will with him, ſaide it was for nothinge, but to help him vp with his burthen againe: it doth not followe that becauſe death which was the priuatiõ of the burthen was ill, therefore the burthed was good. And in this part the ordinary forme of *Malum neceſſarium* aptly reprehendeth this colour, for *priuatio mali neceſſarij eſt mala*, and yet that doth not conuert the nature of the neceſſary euill, but it is euill.

Againe it commeth ſometimes to paſſe, that there is an equalitye

in

In the change of priuation, and as it were a *Dilemma boni*, or a *Dilemma mali*, so that the corruption of the one good is a generation of the other, *Sortis pater æquus vtrique est*: and contrary the remidy of the one euill is the occasion and commencement of another, as in *Scilla* and *Charibdis*.

7 *Quod bono vicinum, bonum: quod bono remotum, malum,*

SVch is the nature of thinges, that things contrary and distant in nature and quality are also seuered and disioyned in place, and thinges like and consenting in quality are placed, and as it were quartred together, for partely in reguard of the nature to spred, multiply, and infect in similitude, and partly in regard of the nature to breake, expell and alter that which is disagreeable and contrary,

most

moſt thinges doe either aſſociate and draw neere to themſelues the like, or at leaſt aſſimilate to themſelues that which approcheth neere them, and do alſo driue away, chaſe, and exterminate their contraries. And that is the reaſon commonly yeelded why the middle region of the aire ſhould be coldeſt, becauſe the Sun and Starrs are either hot by direct beames or by reflection. The direct beames heate the vpper region, the reflected beams from the earth and ſeas heate the lower Region. That which is in the middeſt beinge furtheſt diſtant in place from theſe two regions of heate are moſt diſtant in nature that is coldeſt, which is that they tearme cold or hot, *per antiper aſtaſin*, that is, ruironing by contraries, which was pleaſantly taken hold of by him that ſaid that an honeſt man in theſe daies muſt needes be more honeſt then in ages heretofore, *propter antiperiſtaſin*, becauſe

because the shutting of him in the middest of contraries must needes make the honesty stronger & more compact in it selfe. The reprehension of this colour is, first many things of amplitude in their kind do as it were ingrosse to themselues all, and leaue that which is next them most destitute, as the shootes or vnderwood that grow neere a great and spreading tree, is the most pyned and shrubbish wood of the field, because the great tree doth depriue aud deceiue them of the sappe and nourishment, so he saith well, *Diuites serui maxime serui*, and the comparison was pleasant of him that compared Courtiers attendant in the Courts of Princes, without great place or office to fasting daies, which wer next the holy-daies but otherwise were the leaneſt dayes in all the weeke.

Another reprehension is, that things of greatnes & premidonancy, thogh

they do not extenuate the things adioyning in ſubſtance, yet they drown them and obſcure them in ſhew and appearance, and therefore the aſtronomers ſay, that whereas in all other planets coniunction is the perfecteſt amity: the Sun contrariwiſe is good by aſpect, but euill by coniunction.

A third reprehenſion is, becauſe euill approacheth to good ſometimes for concealment, ſometimes for protection, and good to euill, for conuerſion and reformation. So hypocriſie draweth neere to religion for couert and hiding it ſelfe: *Sæpe latet vitium proximitate boni*, and ſanctuary men which were commonly inordinate men, and malefactors, were woont to be neereſt to Prieſtes, and prelates and holy men, for the Maieſtie of good things is ſuch, as the confines of them are reuered. On the other ſide our Sauiour charged with neerenes of Publicans and Rioters

terſaid, *The Phyſitian aprocheth the ſick, rather then the whole.*

8 *Quod quis culpa ſua contraxit, maius malum, quod ab externis imponitur, minus malum.*

THe reaſons is, becauſe the ſtinge and remorſe of the minde accuſing it ſelfe doubleth all aduerſitye, contrariwiſe the conſidering and recording inwardly, that a man is clear and free from fault, and iuſt imputation, doth attemper outward calamities: For if the euill be in the ſence and in the conſcience both, there is a gemination of it, but if euill be in the one and comfort in the other, it is a kind of compenſation, ſo the Poets in tragidies doe make the moſt paſſionate lamentations, and thoſe that forerun finall diſpaire, to be accuſing queſtioning, and torturing of a mans ſelfe.

Seque vnum clamat cauſamque caput

qui

que malorum. And contrariwise the extremities of worthy persons haue beene annihilated in the consideration of their owne good deseruing. Besides, when the euill commeth from without, there is left a kinde of euaporation of griefe, if it come by humane iniurie either by indignation & meditating of reuenge from our selues, or by expecting or foreconceiuing that *Nemesis* and retribution will take hold of the authors of our hurt, or if it be by fortune or accident, yet there is left a kinde of expostulatiō against the diuine powers. *Atque Deos atque astra vocat crudelia mater.*

But where the euil is deriued from a mans owne fault, there all the strokes deadly inwards, and suffocateth. The repression of this colour is first in respect of hope, for reformation of our faults is in *nostra potestate* but amendment of our fortune simply is

not. Therfore *Demosthenes* in many of his orations sayeth thus to the people of *Athens*, *That which having regard to the time past in the worst point and circumstance of all the rest, that as to the time to come is the best: What is that? Even this, that by your slouth, irresolution, and misgouernment, your affaires are growne to this declination, and decay. For had you vsed and ordered your meanes and forces to the best, and done your parts euery way to the full, and notwithstanding your matters should haue gone backwards in this manner as they do, there had been no hope left of recouery or reparation, but since it hath been only by your owne errors, &c.* So *Epictetus* in his degrees saieth, *The worst state of man is to accuse extern things better then that to accuse a man selfe, and best of all to accuse neither.*

Another reprehension of this colour is in respect of the well bearing of euils, wherewith a man can charge nobody but himselfe, which maketh them

them the leſſe.

Leue fit quod bene fertur onus.

And therefore many natures, that are either extreamely proud, and wil take no fault to themſelues, or elſe very true, and cleauing to theſelues (when they ſee the blame of any thing that fals out il muſt light vpon themſelues) haue no other ſhift but to beare it out well, and to make the leaſt of it, for as we ſee when ſometimes a fault is committed, and before it be knowne, who is to blame, much adoe is made of it, but after if it appeare to be done by a ſon, or by a wife, or by a neare friend, then it is light made of. So much more when a man muſt take it vpon himſelfe. And therefore it is commonly ſeene that Women that marry husbands of their owne chuſing againſt their friends conſents, if they be neuer ſo ill vſed, yet you ſhall ſildome ſee them complaine, but ſet a good face on it.

9 *Quod opera & vertute nostra partum est maius bonum, quod ab alieno beneficio, vel ab indulgentia fortunæ delatum est minus bonum.*

THe reasons are first the future hope, because in the fauours of others or the good winds of fortune wee haue no state or certainty in our indeuours or abilities we haue. So as when they haue purchased vs one good fortune, we haue them as ready and better edged and inured to procure another.

The formes be, *you haue won this by play, you haue not onely the water, but you haue the receipt you can make it again if it be lost &c.* Next because these properties which we enioy by the benefit of others, carry with them an obligation, which seemeth a kinde of burthen, whereas the other which deriue from our selues are like the freest parents, *absque aliquo inde reddendo,*

dendo, and if they proceed from fortune or prouidence, yet they seeme to touch vs secretly with the reuerence of the diuine powers whose fauours we tast and therfore worke a kind of religious feare and restraint, wheras in the other kind, that comes to passe, which the prophet speaketh. *Letantur & exultans, immolant plagis suis, & sacrificant reti suo.*

Thirdly, because that which commeth vnto vs without our owne virtue, yeeldeth not that commendation & reputation, for actions of great felicity may draw wõder, but praiseles, as *Cicero* saide to *Cæsar*, *qua miremur, habemus, qua laudemus expectamus.*

Fourthly, because the purchases of our owne industry are ioyned cõmonly with labour and strife which giues an edge and appetite & makes the fruition of our desire more pleasant, *Suauis cibus a venatu.*

On the other ſide there be fower counter colours to this colour rather then reprehenſions, becauſe they be as large as the colour it ſelfe, firſt becauſe felicity ſemeth to be a character of the faour & loue of the diuine powers, and accordingly worketh both confidence in our ſelues and reſpect & authority from others. And this felicity extendeth to many caſual things, whereunto the care or vertue of man cannot extend, and therfore ſeemeth to be at large good, as when *Caſar* ſaid to the ſayler, *Caſarem portas et fortunam eius*, if he had ſaid, *& virtutem eius*, it had beene ſmall comfort againſt a tempeſt, otherwiſe then if it might ſeem vpon merit to induce fortune.

Next, whatſoeuer is done by vertue and induſtry, ſeemes to be done by a kind of habite and art, and therupon open to be imitated and followed, whereas felicitie is imitable:

ſo

ſo wee generally ſee, that things of nature ſeeme more excellent then things of art, becauſe they be imitable: for, *quod imitabile eſt, potentia quadam vulgatum eſt.*

Thirdly felicity commendeth thoſe things which commeth without our owne labour, for they ſeeme gifts, and the other ſeemes peny worthes: whereupon *Plutarch* ſayth elegantly of the actes of *Timoleon* who was ſo fortunat, compared with the actes of *Ageſilaus* and *Epaminondas, that they were like Homers verſes they ranne ſo eaſily and ſo well.* And therefore it is the worde wee giue vnto poeſie terming it a happy veine, becauſe facility ſeemeth euer to come from happineſſe.

Fourthly, this ſame *præter ſpem, vel præter expectatũ*, doth increaſe ꝑ price & pleaſure of many thinges, and this

cannot be incident to those thinges that proceede from our owne care and compasse.

10 *Gradus priuationis maior videtur quam gradus diminutionis: & rursus gradus inceptionis maior videtur quam gradus incrementi.*

IT is a position in the Mathematiques that there is no proportion betweene somewhat and nothing, therefore the

the degree of nullity and quiddity or act, ſeemeth larger then the degrees of increaſe and decreaſe, as to a monoculous it is more to looſe one eye, then to a man that hath two eyes. So if one haue loſt diuers children, it is more griefe to him to looſe the laſt then all the reſt: becauſe he is *ſpes gregis*, And therefore Sybilla when ſhe brought her three bookes, and had burned two, did double the whole price of both the other, becauſe the burning of that had beene *gradus priuationis*, and not *diminutionis*. This colour is reprehended firſt in thoſe thinges the vſe and ſeruice wherof reſteth in ſufficieney, cõpetency, or determinate quantity, as if a man be to pay one hundreth poundes vpon a penaltye, it is more to him to want xii. pence, then after that xii. pence ſuppoſed to bee wanting, to want ten ſhillings more: ſo the decay of a mans eſtate ſeemes

to

to bee moſt touched in the degree when he firſt growes behind, more then afterwards when he proues nothing worth. And heereof the common formes are, *Sera in fundo perſimonia*, and as good neuer awhit, as neuer the better, &c. It is reprehended alſo in reſpect of that notion, *Corruptio vnius, generatio alterius*: ſo that *gradus primationis* is many tims leſſe matter, becauſe it giues the cauſe, and motiue to ſome new courſe. As whē Demoſtenes reprehended the people for harkning to the conditiōs offered by king Philip, being not honorable nor equall, he ſayeth they were but elements of their ſloth and weakeneſſe, which if they were taken away, neceſſity would teach them ſtronger reſolutions. So Doctor Hector was wont to ſaye to the Dames of London when they complained they were they could not tell how, but yet they could not endure

dure to take any Medicine, hee woulde tell them, their way was onely to bee ſicke, for then they woulde bee glad to take any Medicine.

Thirdly, this colour may be reprehended, in reſpect that the degree of decreaſe is more ſenſitiue, then the degree of priuaſion, for in the mind of men, *gradus diminutionis* may work a wauering betweene hope and feare, and keepe the mind in ſuſpence from feeling and accommodating in patience, and reſolution: heereof the common formes are, *Better eye out then alwaies ake*, make or marre, &c.

For the ſecond braunch of this colour, it depends vpon the ſame generall reaſon: hence grew the common place of extoling the beginning of euery thing. *Dimidiũ facti qui bene cœpit habet*

habet. This made the Astrologers so idle as to iudge of a mans nature & destiny by the constellation of the moment of his natiuity, or conception. This colour is reprehended, because many inceptions are but as Epicurus tearmeth them, *tentamenta*, that is, imperfect offers, and essaies, which vanish and come to no substance without any iteration, so as in such cases the second degree seemes the worthiest, as the body-horse in the Carte, that draweth more then the fore-horse, hereof the common forms are, *the second blow maks the fray, the second word makes the bargaine, alter principium dedit, alter modū abstulit, &c.* Another reprehension of this colour is in respect of defatigation, which makes perseuerance of greater dignity then inception, for chaunce or instinct of nature may cause inception, but setled affection or iudgement maketh the continuance.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, this colour is reprehended in ſuch things which haue a naturall courſe, and inclinition contrary to an inception. So that the inception is continually euacuated and gets no ſtart, but there behoueth *perpetua inceptio*, as in the common forme: *non progredi eſt regredi, qui non proficit, deficit*, Running againſt the hill: rowing againſt the ſtreame, &c. For if it be with the ſtreame or with the hil, then the degree of inception is more then all the reſt.

Fourthly, this colour is to be vnderſtood of *gradus inceptionis à potẽtia, ad actum comparatus cum gradu ab actu ad incrementũ*: For otherwiſe, *maior videtur gradus ab impotentia, ad potentiam, quam à potentia ad actum.*

FINIS.